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I Introduction
The jurisprudence of the Warren Court was inherently political,' and its
legacy, which endures today, is also inherently political. The very term "the
Warren Court" is synonymous with notions of progressive values and a long
string of decisions that were courageous in their time for interpreting the
Constitution expansively. But one cannot view this one legacy of the Warren
Court in a vacuum. The Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court after it, have
systematically undermined the legacy of the Warren Court. Often, they did
not clearly and directly overrule Warren Court decisions. Rather, those later

*
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See generally ALExANDER M. BICKEL, PoLnIcs AND nm WARREN COURT (1973)

(discussing interaction of politics and Constitution during Warren Court); PinuP B. KURLAND,
PoLrICs, THE CoNSTrYrloN AND THE WARREN CoURT (1970) (surveying politics of Warren
Court after appointment of Chief Justice Burger).
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Courts systematically weakened the legacy of the Warren Court through
decisions cloaked in the language of federalism and separation of powers.
This dynamic is clear throughout all aspects ofthe Warren Court's legacy
that this Symposium explores, from criminal procedure, to apportionment, to
civil liberties. Brown v. Board of Education' is the heart and soul of the
Warren Court's progressive legacy, and Brown provides a compelling illustration of the evolving legacy of the Warren Court.'
My comments about the Warren Court's legacy and the institutional role
of the federal courts focus on Brown and the implementation decisions that
followed it. Brown, of course, acts as the centerpiece of the Warren Court's
progressive jurisprudence, standing for the proposition that racial segregation
in education is inherently unequal. In theory, Brown illustrates the Warren
Court's progressive legacy as a champion for civil rights. However, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts narrowed the meaning of Brown by constraining
the ability of federal courts to remediate the harms caused by racial segregation. As I will demonstrate, these courts grounded their articulated rationales
in the concept of federalism: to "protect" the states and localities against the
purported overarching power of the federal government and thus to delineate
the appropriate boundaries between state and federal power. The Burger and
Relmquist Courts achieved this "protection" by imposing an overly rigid
causation requirement in situations in which the school district arguably was
not responsible for racially identifiable schools.4 Viewing the Brown implementation decisions as a whole, we see that the imposition of a rigid causation
requirement has placed extraordinary constraints on the power of the federal
courts to protect the rights of minority group members. Accordingly, the rigid
causation requirement has largely prevented those courts from providing
appropriate relief in many school segregation cases.'

Ultimately, the Brown implementation decisions are important for more
than what they tell us about education, race, and equality. I argue that these

decisions illustrate the accordion-like relationship between placing limits on
federal remedial power and contracting the underlying substantive right.
2.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

3. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ,A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 286 (1993) ("Instead,
Brown v. Board of Education stands at the head of the cases decided by the Warren Court. In
many ways, Brown was the watershed constitutional case of this century .... When Brown
struck down school segregation, it signaled the beginning of effective enforcement of civil rights
in American law.").
4. See infra Part II (discussing standards used by Burger and Rehnquist Courts in
determining causation in desegregation cases).
5. See infra Part IV (describing impact of rigid causation requirements on relief provided
by courts).
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Brown's progeny demonstrate how efforts to limit the lower federal courts'
remedial power in the name of protecting state and local interests have overridden, and thus redefined, the substantive vision of equality advanced by the
Warren Court. At base, the Supreme Court has placed curbs on the lower
federal courts' ability to issue meaningful remedies for violation of the
desegregation mandate, on the theory that the use of the federal judicial power
in those cases was excessive, and that state and local interests needed protection against an overarching federal judiciary bent on aggrandizement.
I maintain that the implementation decisions issued many years after
Brown I by successive Supreme Courts have changed what Brown actually
means. Over time, the federal judiciary grappled with the question of crafing
appropriate remedies, both in cases involving a harm caused by a confluence
of public and private discriminatory actions, and in cases in which significant
racial integration would require restructuring school districts and perhaps
entire metropolitan areas. This created conflict within the judiciary, as an
increasingly conservative Supreme Court wrestled with the application of
Brown and its progeny.
The paradigmatic example is, of course, Milliken v. Bradley.6 In
Milliken, the Supreme Court said that the core problem was federalism - for
a federal court simply could not engage in a "complete restructuring of the
laws [of a state] relating to school districts"7 in the absence of a constitutional
violation of sufficient scope necessary to support such a remedy. What
constitutional violation could provide this basis? In order to sustain such a
far-reaching remedy, "it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the
state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation."' Plaintiffs could rarely meet this
burden and, as a result, Milliken made it "all but impossible to achieve racial
integration within predominantly minority school districts."9 This Article
explores how this change in meaning occurred and argues that the methodology embedded within the Brown implementation cases is important for
understanding subsequent Supreme Courts' responses to the progressive
possibilities raised by the Warren Court more generally.
The Brown implementation decisions are also important because the
patterns within them are present in at least two other areas of constitutional
law: standing doctrine and municipal liability. In those areas, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts also express a purported commitment to an important
6.
7.
8.
9.

418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743 (1974).
Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
GARY ORPIEW & SusAN E. EATON, DISMANTUNG DESEGREGATION 144 (1996).
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structural principle (such as federalism or separation of powers) that supposedly restrains a federal court's power to hear a case, hold an entity liable, or
issue appropriate relief. In each of these areas, the Court resorts to an overly
rigid causation analysis to reach foregone conclusions. Thus, in the standing
analysis, the Court focuses on the lack of a direct causal relationship between
the injury and the conduct sufficient to create a judicially cognizable claim.1"
Similarly, in the municipal liability context, the Court emphasizes the need for
a direct causal link between the municipal action and the alleged deprivation
to protect local autonomy and guard against federalizing hiring standards."
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have cast the Court as a champion of
seemingly "neutral" constructs such as federalism and separation of powers,
while simultaneously undermining the progressive reforms championed by the
Warren Court.'" This response, fealty to structural principles through a
methodology that applies causation requirements strictly, represents at least
one "jurisprudential legacy" of the Warren Court. This Article concludes by
examining the imposition of rigid causation constraints in the affirmative
action area and asking if the same federalism and separation of powers concerns that animated the imposition of such constraints in other areas are also
present there. As it turns out, the Court has applied strict notions of causation
in the affirmative action area in a manner that undermines the ability of
governmental actors to justify affirmative action plans. In each of these areas,
standing doctrine, municipal liability, and affirmation action, a reliance on
rigidly-applied causation has resulted in rulings that frustrate the progressive
aims of the Warren Court.
I. The Brown Implementation Decisions: The Right and the Remedy
At the core of Brown v. BoardofEducation was a potentially revolutionary and redemptive statement: the Court's admonition that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."' 3 The ramifications of this ruling
were so clearly incendiary that the Court itself retreated from them a year later
by issuing a weak and oft-criticized implementation decision 4 that provided
10. See infra Part IIlA (describing changes in standing doctrine between Warren Court
and subsequent Supreme Courts).
11.
See infra Part Il1.B (describing limitations on imposing constitutional claims for
liability on municipalities).
12. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Realism AboutFederalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304,130910 (1999) ("Experience with federalism doctrine in particular similarly demonstrates that judges
invoke the doctrine selectively to promote policy objectives.").
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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a roadmap for future recalcitrance. 5 In 1958, the Court in Cooperv. Aaron 6
used the crisis at Little Rock as an opportunity to further assert its authority
to "say what the law is,"'7 but it did not provide any additional guidance as to
what exactly the desegregation mandate actually required.
Indeed, the Court did not return to the question of implementation of its
Brown mandate with any specificity until nearly the end of the Warren Court
era in1968. That case, Green v. County School BoardofNew Kent County,"8
presented the Court with a desegregation question, but in perhaps the easiest
possible factual milieu: a rural Southern county, formerly dejure segregated,
with little residential integration.' 9 In Green, the Court took the opportunity
to say that its patience had finally run out and that delay was no longer tolerable.2" Thus, the Court issued its famous admonition that school boards had an
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch."'" But in enunciating this broad mandate, the Court did not provide
specificity with respect to what was required of school districts except in the
most uncomplicated of circumstances. 22
Nevertheless, the transformative potential of Brown I remained as the
Warren Court era came to a close, and so a Supreme Court dominated by
increasingly conservative majorities came to determine what the desegregation
mandate really required. In 1971, the Court issued its much heralded Swann
v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education' decision, which formulated
guidelines for school districts and district courts to consider in managing the
transition to "unitary" school systems.24 In enunciating the responsibilities of
local school districts and the outlines of the federal courts' power to issue
appropriate remedies, the Supreme Court took cognizance of a transcendent
15. See DONAiD E. LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE 112-15 (1992) (describing
aftermath of Brown v. BoardofEducation).
16. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
17. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
18. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
19. See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 432 (1968)
(explaining that "[tihere is no residential segregation in the county").
20. Id. at 438.
21.
Id. at 437-38.
22. Indeed, the Court clarified what would not meet Brown's mandate by stating that
freedom of choice plans used alone in a manner that does not indicate "real promise of aiding
a desegregation program" were insufficient. Id. at 440-41.
23. 402 U.S. 1(1971).
24. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,6 (1971) (discussing
lower courts' need for guidelines in implementing Brown's mandate).
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social reality, the "housing-schools nexus"25 by stating that "People gravitate
toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs
of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner-city neighborhoods."26
That the Court understood the importance of this core reality was deeply
encouraging; that it was prepared to endorse the lower federal court's use of
its remedial power to disestablish this reality was even more stunning.27 But
this epiphany was one that the Court regrettably was soon to forget. As the
press of the desegregation mandate moved North, the Supreme Court's
willingness to engage in the ongoing and difficult endeavor of desegregating
northern schools, which had never been the subject of de jure segregation
requirements, flagged.2"
25. See CHARLEs E. DAYEETAL.,HOUSiNGANDCOMMUN1TYDEVELOPMENT 595-600 (3d
ed. 1999) (describing judicial responses to relationship between housing conditions and
educational opportunity).
26. Swann, 402 U.S. at 20- 21.
27. Id. The Court's discussion of the gravity of the housing-schools nexus was fullthroated and comprehensive. The Court continued:
In the past, choices in this respect have been used as a potent weapon for creating
or maintaining a state-segregated school system. In addition to the classic pattern
of building schools specifically intended for Negro or white students, school
authorities have sometimes, since Brown, closed schools which appeared likely to
become racially mixed through changes in neighborhood residential patterns. This
was sometimes accompanied by building new schools in the areas of white suburban expansion farthest from Negro population centers in order to maintain the
separation of the races with a minimum departure from the formal principles of
"neighborhood zoning." Such a policy does more than simply influence the shortrun composition of the student body of a new school. It may well promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined with "neighborhood zoning,"
further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races. Upon a
proper showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy.
Id. at21.
28. See, e.g., LIVELY, supra note 15, at 120-26. In retrospect, the transitional case is
clearly Keyes v. Sch. Dist.No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), which held that, in the absence of dejure
segregation, that plaintiffs must prove that the segregated conditions resulted from the "School
Board's deliberate racial segregation policy." Id. at 204. As Donald Lively has aptly observed,
in reality the dejure/defacto distinction meant that when segregation "could be attributed to
other factors other than what the Court would consider purposeful state action, no duty to
desegregate would exist." LIVELY, supra note 15, at 120. The majority tempered this holding
somewhat by ruling that plaintiffs would not be required to make a fresh showing of segregative
intent with respect to each portion of the city in which they sought relief. Keyes, 413 U.S. at
208. The majority opinion in Keyes sparked a sharp dissent from then Justice Rehnquist that
probed the appropriate indicia of proof necessary to sustain a showing of a constitutional
violation in a school district that had not formerly been segregated by law. Id. at 254
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The flashpoint of the Court's resistance focused on the housing-schools
nexus specifically, and on demographic change more generally. The Court
ultimately would decide the question of Brown's essential meaning (that is,
what did the Brown plaintiffs really win?) by balancing the relative powers of
two institutional players: the states and their localities (described by reference
to the importance of protecting concepts of federalism) and the federal courts
(described by reference to those courts' power to grant on-going injunctive
relief in the form of desegregation decrees).
Milliken v. Bradley,29 which the Burger Court decided in 1974, was the
watershed. Milliken concerned a suit that had been brought against the City
of Detroit, the Michigan Board of Education, and a variety of other state and
local governmental defendants alleging, inter alia, that the Detroit public
school system was segregated on the basis of race. 0 The district court held
that because "[glovemmental actions and inaction at all levels . . .have
combined, with those of private organizations... to establish and to maintain
the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan
area,"i a metropolitan, multidistrict remedy was appropriate. This ruling was
based on the district court's belief that "relief of segregation in the public
schools of the City of Detroit cannot be accomplished within the corporate
geographic limits of the city." 32 School district attendance zones were based
on residence: white children largely attended suburban schools because they
lived in suburban areas 3 Thus, the district court sought to include fifty-three
suburban school districts in an interdistrict desegregation remedy. 34 The
lower courts
ruled that this method was the only way to achieve actual deseg35
regation.
The Burger Court disagreed and ruled that the district court exceeded the
scope of its remedial authority by granting interdistrict relief in the absence

(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Rehnquist's view was that the majority had erred because it had
taken a "long leap in this area of constitutional law in equating the district-wide consequences
of gerrymandering individual attendance zones in a district where separation of the races was
never required by law with statutes or ordinances in other jurisdictions which did so require."
Id. at 265 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
30. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 723 (1974) (describing allegations that
Detroit's schools were radically segregated).
31.
Id. at 724.
32. Id. at 765-66 (White, J.,
dissenting).
33. See id.at 771 n.5 (White, J.,
dissenting) (describing movement of white children to
predominantly white schools near city borders during optional attendance program).
34. Id. at 733.
35. Id. at 752.
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of a finding of an interdistrict constitutional violation.36 The Court resorted to
the maxim of equity jurisprudence that "the scope of the remedy is determined
by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation."37 In practice, this
ruling required plaintiffs to show that the state or the suburban school districts
were a "substantial cause" of the racial segregation present within the school
district seeking a multidistrict remedy.
Conveniently ignoring findings
below of state culpability,39 the Court grafted a strong causation constraint into
its interpretation of the lower federal courts' equity powers.
By imposing this causation requirement, the Court prevented the use of
the suburban school districts as an integrative resource, notwithstanding the
fact that a Detroit-only plan would have left the Detroit public schools "75 to
90 percent black and that the district would become progressively more black
as whites left the city."4 Milliken severely undercut Brown as a vehicle for
providing racially integrated education. Imposition of a rigid causation
requirement constrained the extent of the federal courts' power to provide such
a remedy because neither the state nor the suburbs caused the injury. The
practical result, of course, was that the causation requirement significantly
affected the nature and quality of the right at issue. As the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit had so eloquently stated below, to conclude that a Detroitonly remedy would be appropriate was to return to the "haunting memories of
the now long overruled and discredited 'separate but equal doctrine' of Plessy
v. Ferguson,"thus "nullify[ing] Brown v. Board ofEducation which overruled
Plessy .... 1,41
The Supreme Court's desegregation implementation jurisprudence since
that time has followed Milliken's lead. Decided just a few years later, Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler42 was entirely consistent with
Milliken's approach to defining the scope of the federal courts' remedial
powers. 43 To Milliken's admonition that right and remedy must be casually
related, Pasadena added that the presence of a "normal pattern of human

36. Id. at 744-45.
37. Id. at 744.
38. See id. at 745 ("Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of
the... school districts... have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.").
39. See id. at 770-73 (White, J., dissenting) (describing lower court's finding of state
culpability).
40. Id. at 767 (White, J., dissenting).
41.
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215,249 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
42. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
43. See Pasadena City Bd. of Edue. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,434 (1976) (cautioning
that courts have limited power to dismantle dual school systems).
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'
migration 44
- meaning the movement of whites out of certain residential areas,
frustrating the aims of desegregation - would not support the federal courts'
ability to compel school districts to alter school attendance zones that could
take account of those changes.4"
As inMilliken, the Burger Court recognized the "schools/housing nexus"
in that it appreciated that any change in Pasadena's residential patterns would
have an impact on the racial composition of its public schools.46 But, again
mirroring the Milliken case, the Court largely ignored the import of that
connection. Instead, the Court again framed the constraint on the district
court's remedial powers in the language of causation. The Court clearly
stated that the district court never had the authority to impose an ongoing
requirement that no school within the Pasadena system have a majority of
minority students because "subsequent changes in the racial mix. . might be
caused by factors for which the defendants could not be considered responsible."'47 The Court thus framed the federal court's remedial jurisdiction in
terms of its limits, which were enforced and maintained by a tightly defined
causation requirement.4 8
Flash forward a few years to the Rehnquist Court. The question becomes: when can courts release school districts that have been subject to
desegregation decrees from federal judicial oversight? In BoardofEducation
ofOklahoma City v. Dowell,49 the Rehnquist Court answered this question and
thereby placed its indelible stamp on the Brown desegregation mandate and
implementation jurisprudence.5" Like the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court
resorted to causation as the tool to constrain the ability of the lower federal
courts to structure remedies. This limitation on the ability to structure remedies had the practical effect of actually constraining the underlying right.
In Dowell, the question was: when may a court dissolve a desegregation
decree? The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had held that the
Oklahoma Board of Education could only be relieved of federal judicial

44. Id. at 436.
45. See id.at 436-37 (stating district court fully performed its function of providing
remedy after implementing racially neutral attendance pattern and that district court could not
require rearranging attendance zones annually to preserve desired racial mix).
46. See id. at 436 (stating that "normal human migration" will result in shifts of racial mix
at some schools).
47. Id. at 434.
48. See id.("These limits are in part tied to the necessity of establishing that school
authorities have in some manner caused unconstitutional segregation... ").
49. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
50. See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (reasoning that
school district released from desegregation injunction no longer required court supervision).
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oversight, and the desegregation decree dissolved, upon a showing of "dramatic changes in conditions unforeseen at the time of the decree that...
impose extreme and unexpectedly oppressive hardships on the obligor."" The
problem from the Tenth Circuit's perspective was that, despite a prior finding
of unitary status, several of Oklahoma's schools would revert to being predominantly black even under the outstanding desegregation plan. 2 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit refused to lift the injunction because "circumstances
. . . had not
5 3
changed enough to justify modification of the decree.
The Rehnquist Court ruled that this standard was too high. Desegregation
decrees were not intended to operate into perpetuity; the goal was a return to
local control over decision-making affecting the schools. 4 What counted in
determining whether a court could terminate an injunction was the school
board's "good faith" and whether the vestiges of the past discriminatory action
had been "eliminated to the extent practicable." 5 This forward-looking
standard asked whether the school district was currently engaging in de jure
segregative conduct; it was far less concerned with the ongoing vestiges of past
discriminatory conduct. 6 This relaxed standard essentially invited withdrawal
of federal judicial oversight and allowed school districts to revert to local
control in a manner that ignored, in Justice Marshall's words, the "unique harm
associated with a system of racially identifiable schools."5 " In this manner, as
before, constraint on the ability to order ongoing relief operated to limit and
redefine the underlying substantive right.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Dowell explicitly examined the housingschools nexus and the related question of causation. As Justice Marshall
accurately indicated, the majority opinion adopted a relaxed standard for
ordering the dissolution of a desegregation decree in the teeth of prior judicial
findings that the school board had "destroyed some integrated neighborhoods
and schools" and had "preserved and augmented existing residential segregation."5" The majority opinion seized on a more recent district court opinion
51.
Id. at 244.
52. See id.(stating that number of schools would return to being primarily one-race under
existing plan).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 248 (noting that "necessary concern for the important values of local control
of public school systems dictates that a federal court's regulatory control of such systems not
extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination").
55. Id. at 249-50.
56. See id.250-51 ("If the Board was entitled to have the decree terminated as of 1985,
the District Court should then evaluate the Board's decision to implement the SRP under
appropriate equal protection principles.").
57. Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 254 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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which found that present residential segregation was the result of "private
decisionmaking and economics" and thus could not be charged to the school
board.5 9 The problem was that the record contained other, more ominous
findings suggesting that the school board helped to create residential segregation which, in turn, created segregated schools.6'
As in Milliken, the Court in Dowell paid "insufficient attention to the
roles of the State, local officials, and the Board in creating what are now selfperpetuating patterns of residential segregation."6 1 The Court was all too
willing to accept a narrative which presumed that the school district did not
cause residential segregation and that the cause or causes of such segregation
were due to "personal preferences," safely outside the purview of constitutional requirements and federal judicial authority. This narrative foreshortened the federal courts' oversight even as it further redefined the nature of the
right articulated in Brown L62
More recently, the Rehnquist Court has evoked Milliken to constrain the
excessive use of federal power in implementing desegregation decrees and to
ensure that state and local governments are not stripped of their "existence as
59. See id. at 243 (stating that present residential segregation was "too attenuated to be
a vestige of former school segregation" and attributing present residential segregation to private
decision-making and economics).
60. As Justice Marshall argued:
The record in this case amply demonstrates this form of complicity in residential
segregation on the part of the Board. The District Court found as early as 1965 that
the Board's use of neighborhood schools "serve[d] to ... exten[d] areas of all
Negro housing, destroying in the process already integrated neighborhoods and
thereby increasing the number of segregated schools." It was because of the School
Board's responsibility for residential segregation that the District Court refused to
permit the Board to superimpose a neighborhood plan over the racially isolated
northeast quadrant.
Id. at 264-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 265 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Decided the following year, Freeman v.Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), also concerned
the question of when a court may release a school district from federal judicial oversight. In
Freeman, the Court held that federal judicial oversight of a school district's desegregation plan
may be released incrementally. Id. at 490-91. Thus, a school district may be released from
supervision in areas in which it has achieved compliance even though it has not complied with
the desegregation order in its entirety. Id. at 491. Freeman was consistent with Dowell in that
it reaffirmed the notion of a restricted role for the federal courts in providing a remedy for
segregative actions. As Laurence Tribe has suggested with respect to Freeman: "[T]he case
stands for the proposition that a district court is to be concerned primarily with remedying
specific violations of the law, not with remedying social problems, such as racially segregated
residential housing patterns, allegedly caused by phenomena triggered by, but not quite directly
and demonstrably traceable to, specific governmental actions taken in violation of federal law."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTioNAL LAW 606 (3d ed. 2000).
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independent governmental entities."63 In Missouri v. Jenkins,' the Court
reviewed certain elements of a wide-ranging desegregation plan covering the
Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan school district (KCMSD).6' In 1985, the
district court found the State of Kansas and the KCMSD liable for creating an
intradistrictviolation in that they operated "a segregated school system within
the KCMSD."' Because of Milliken, the district court was constrained in its
ability to use white students located in suburban areas outside of the KCMSD
as an integrative resource.6' Recognizing this constraint, the district court
ordered, inter alia, significant capital improvements for schools within the
KCMSD, including an expensive magnet program and significant salary
increases for school staff." The explicit rationale for these improvements and
the salary order was "desegregative attractiveness;"69 that is, to "draw nonminority students from the private schools who have abandoned or avoided
KCMSD, and draw in additional non-minority students from the suburbs."70
In assessing the state's challenge to the district court's order, the Court
began with the familiar equity maxim that it had applied with devastating
effect in Milliken: the scope of the violation determines the scope of the
appropriate relief.71 Because the district court had not found an interdistrict
constitutional violation, the district court was outside of its remedial authority
in ordering a remedial plan that sought the interdistnctgoal of "desegregative
attractiveness.""2 In Jenkins, the Court reaffirmed its ruling in Milliken that
had turned on causation: "A district court seeking to remedy an intradistrict
violation that has not 'directly caused' significant interdistrict effects, exceeds
its remedial authority if it orders a remedy with an interdistrict purpose."7 3 The
task of the district court was to remedy the violation to the "'extent practicable. "" 4 Thus, the Court had moved to an understanding of an appropriate
63. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995).
64. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
65. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 131.
66. Id. at 74.
67. See id. at 76 (refusing to allow interdistrict redistribution without interdistrict
violation).
68. See id. at 76-78 (discussing district court's comprehensive improvement plan).
69. See id. at 94 (finding that district court's "pursuit of 'desegregative attractiveness' is
beyond the scope of its broad remedial authority" (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280
(1977))).
70. Id. at 77 (quoting district court opinion of same case).
71. Id. at 88 (relying on "principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be
determined by the violation" (quoting Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281-82)).
72. Id. at94.
73. Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 89 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,492 (1992)).
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remedy that saw the harm from a position of constraint. That is, through the
Jenkins decision, right and remedy now had an accordion-like relationship,
each contracting together. As the Court had constrained the ability of the
lower federal courts to enter wide-ranging relief, so too had it diminished the
nature of the right.
By reviewing Brown I and its progeny, the Warren Court's legacy and the
way that subsequent Courts have shaped and molded that legacy becomes
apparent. The Warren Court in Brown I proclaimed that separate educational
facilities were inherently unequal." This ruling was critically important in
declaring an incredibly significant constitutional principle. However, later
Courts shouldered the burden of implementing that principle in real life.
Those later Courts used the language of federalism as a sword, effectively
cutting away much of the lower courts' ability to implement Brown I in any
meaningful way.
I. Standing andMunicipalLiability
The pattern illustrated in Brown and its progeny is readily apparent in two
other areas of constitutional law: standing and municipal liability. In both of
these areas, the Warren Court created a legacy that cannot be reviewed without
looking at the decisions of later Courts. Therefore, in each of these areas, I
highlight one "signature" case that typifies the use of a rigid causation requirement to frustrate progressive aims, to further "neutral" notions of
constitutionalism, and to enforce certain structural principles, such as federalism and separation of powers.
A. The Law of Standing: SeparationofPowers Concerns
"Standing," or the question of"[w]hether a party has a sufficient stake in
an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy,"7 6 is part and parcel of the Article III, Section 2 requirement that
federal courts decide "Cases" or "Controversies. ""' So as not to exceed its
power under Article III, a federal court may only entertain an action in which
the party before it has a constitutionally sufficient claim.7 The standing
requirement has both constitutional and prudential elements.79 This Article
will focus on the constitutional elements of injury in fact, causation, and
75. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place in modem jurisprudence).
76. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
77. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2.
78. TRIBE, supra note 62, at 387-88.
79. Id. at 386-87.
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redressability, 0 and then analyze the causation and redressability elements
more specifically. The causation element requires the injury to be "'fairly
traceable' to the actions of the defendant." ' The redressability component
requires that the injury "will likely be redressed by a favorable decision." 2
The two elements share related qualities in that they both serve as corollaries
to the injury in fact requirement, 3 insuring that the relationship between party,
claim, and potential relief are sufficiently close to warrant the intervention of
an Article III court.
As Professor Laurence Tribe has suggested, during the Warren Court era,
the standing inquiry was primarily concerned with insuring that a party with
the appropriate stake in the outcome of the litigation was before the federal
court. 4 The presence of such a party ensured that the case contained the
"concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."8 Thus, the Warren Court did not view the standing question as one
grounded in separation of powers concerns. Instead, the Court believed that
problems arose when a litigant lacked a sufficiently concrete stake in the
litigation, 6creating the possibility that the federal courts would issue advisory
opinions.

8

By the end of the Burger Court period, however, the Court viewed the
standing doctrine as grounded in separation of powers concerns; that is, that
the doctrine should reaffirm the "properly limited role of the courts in democratic society.""7 Justice Scalia was an early champion of this view, which
emphasized the narrowness of federal court jurisdiction and the inappropriateness of courts undertaking either executive or legislative tasks."' In standing
doctrine cases, the Burger Court applied rigid causation requirements in an
80. Id.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
81.
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
82. Id.
83. See TRIBE, supra note 62, at 424 ("The Supreme Court has emphasized that the injuryin-fact requirement includes as a corollary a requirement that a litigant show that the challenged
government action caused the litigant's injury - or, in what the Court has sometimes deemed
an equivalent formulation, that ending or reversing that challenged action would end or repair
the injury.").
See id. at 388 (stating that personal stake was primary factor).
84.
Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)).
85.
86.
Id.
87.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 (1975)).
TRIBE, supra note 62, at 388-89 (citing Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine ofStanding as
88.
an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983)).
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effort to prevent federal courts from usurping power from the legislative and
executive branches. At the same time, the Burger Court's imposition of a
narrow causation requirement resulted in the undermining of progressive

goals.
Allen v. Wright 9 illustrates this result particularly well. In Allen, parents
of black children challenged the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) procedures
for denying tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools.9
They argued that the failure of the IRS to deny tax exempt status to private
schools in desegregation areas amounted to a subsidy to segregated schools,
which "foster[ed] and encourage[d] the organization, operation and expansion
of institutions providing racially segregated educational opportunities for

white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public school districts," 91

thereby interfering with governmental desegregation efforts. The plaintiffs
claimed that the segregated schools' tax exempt status amounted to financial
aid for segregated schools, which in turn allowed those schools to expand and
prosper.' This result motivated white parents to send their children to these
schools and placed a federal imprimatur on segregated educational facilities.9"
These actions frustrated the aims of a variety of governmental entities that
were working assiduously to desegregate the public schools in the area.94
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs had
standing to pursue this "desegregation claim" in the federal courts. 9" Writing
for the Court, Justice O'Connor began by conceding that the plaintiff had met
the injury in fact requirement because, if proven, the assertion that a child's
right to attend an integrated school had been denied or diminished was judicially cognizable.96 From the Court's perspective, the problem was causation:
"[Tihe injury alleged is not fairly traceable to the Governmental conduct
89.
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
90. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739 (1984).
91. Id. at 745.
92. See id. at 745-46 (explaining allegations of complaint).
93. See id. at 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting plaintiffs' allegations from complaint); id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
94. See id. at 773-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting plaintiffs' allegations from
complaint).
95. Id. at 740. Plaintiffs had also pressed a second claim: that they were injured in fact
by virtue of direct governmental aid to discriminatory private schools. Id. at 752. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert this claim in the
federal court. Id. at 753-56. However, my discussion will focus exclusively on the claim
described in the text (the "desegregation claim").
96. See id. at 756 (stating that such right is judicially cognizable beyond all doubt (citing
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954))).
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respondents challenge as unlawful."I Why was this the case? For the Court,
the "line of causation" between the conduct (the IRS's failure to deny tax
exemptions) and the injury (frustration of the public school desegregation
process) was "attenuated at best."'98 Here, the Court was describing the need
for a direct and unimpeded causal relationship between injury and conduct.
In other words, the Court's concern was that the relationship was indirect
and attenuated as opposed to clear, uncompromised, and unbroken. The
plaintiffs could not prove that segregated private schools receiving a tax
exemption resulted in an "appreciable difference in public school integration. " The Court found too many other factors that could explain why so
few white students were present in the public school system. To create the
direct chain of causation that the Court required, far too much "speculation"
would be necessary. The Court's language is instructive:
It is, first, uncertain how many racially discriminatory private schools are
in fact receiving tax exemptions. Moreover, it is entirely speculative, as
respondents themselves conceded in the Court of Appeals, whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school
to change its policies. It is just as speculative whether any given parent of
a child attending such a private school would decide to transfer the child
to public school as a result of any changes in educational or financial
policy made by the private school once it was threatened with loss of taxexempt status. It is also pure speculation whether, in a particular community, a large enough number of the numerous relevant school officials and
parents would reach decisions that collectively would have a significant
impact on the racial composition of the public schools."°
The Court refused to make any assumptions about the relationship
between private, segregated schools and public schools undergoing the
process of desegregation in the same locale because those assumptions would
have required assessments about the actions of third parties, such as white
parents and private school officials.10 Rather than "pure speculation" as the
Court charged, those assumptions were simply logical intuitive steps typically
allowed in the early pleading stages of a lawsuit." 2 The Court reacted as if
97.

Id. at 757.

98.

Id.

99.
100.

Id. at 758.
Id. (citations omitted).

101.

See id. at 759 (finding that existence of numerous third parties prevented assumption

of causality).
102. Id. at 767-68 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that courts take all material
allegations of complaint as true when deciding motions to dismiss) (quoting Galdstone, Realtors
v. Viii. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,109 (1979)).
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the two processes were occurring in different worlds, in independent parallel
universes, each completely unaffected and untouched by the other. But to
assume no connection between the two was to ignore reality. Indeed, the
Court's supposition was not only completely nonsensical, but was inconsistent
with its earlier concession that the "diminished ability to receive an education
in a racially integrated school [is]... one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system." ' 3
Why was this narrow construction of causation required? What animated
its imposition? The answer for the Court was the need to protect the underlying goal of the standing analysis: separation of powers. 4 A rigid causation
requirement was necessary to maintain the proper role of the federal courts
and disallow suits that challenged agency action generally, as opposed to
"identifiable Government violations of law." ' 5 A strict construction of the
"fairly traceable" requirement would confine the Article III courts "to their
traditional role of protecting individuals against impositions by the majority
rather than interfering with the manner in which the politically accountable
branches serve the interests of the majority."'" Thus, the Court's repetition
of the pattern from the Brown implementation cases is manifest. In those
cases, the Court's articulated underlying goal was to protect the proper
distribution of power between the states and the federal government." ° To
achieve that goal, the Court imposed a narrow causation requirement. Here,
the Court's articulated goal was to affirm a structural principle intended to
support, rather than to subvert, democratic norms."° Thus, the Court's
position was that unelected judges with life tenure should not adjudicate cases
in which resolution of the essential dispute was assigned to another, democratically elected branch1 °9
The majority opinion in Allen was problematic on several fronts. First,
as Justice Brennan explained in dissent, the Court had previously found

103. Id. at 756. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent: "Common sense alone would
recognize that the elimination of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools
would serve to lessen the impact that those institutions have in defeating efforts to desegregate
the public schools." Id. at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 761 n.26 (disagreeing with Justice Stevens's position that separation of
powers principles merely underlie justiciability requirement).
105. Id. at 759.
106. TRIBE, supra note 62, at 389 (citing Scalia, supra note 88, at 894-95).
107. See supraPart H(summarizing objectives of Brown and its progeny).
108. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 (1984) (recognizing that separation of
powers notion dictates proper role of federal courts).
109. See id. at 761 (explaining that separation of powers prevents courts from recognizing
standing in cases seeking to restructure system created by executive branch).
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standing in a very similar factual setting in Norwood v. Harrison."' In
Norwood, plaintiffs alleged that a state program that provided textbooks to
students attending either public or private schools, regardless of the school's
racially discriminatory policies, had infringed their right to attend a racially
integrated public school system."' One issue in Norwood involved the
sufficiency of the causal relationship between the plaintiffs' alleged injuries
and the conduct of the state." 2 Assumptions about the behavior of third
parties did not trouble the Norwood Court:

[The Constitution does not permit the State to aid discrimination even
when there is no precise casual relationship between state financial aid to
private schools and the continued well-being of that school. A State may
not grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if that aid has a
significanttendencyto facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination. 113
Second, the majority's reliance on the separation of powers rationale was
problematic. As Justice Stevens noted, resort to separation of powers principles did not answer the question of whether the plaintiffs had standing to
pursue their claims before an Article InI court." 4 He aptly pointed out that
imposing a rigid causal requirement because of purported separation of
powers concerns "confuses the standing doctrine with the justiciability of the
issues that [the] respondents seek to raise." ' Instead, the Court should center
the standing inquiry on whether the "party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."1" 6 Rather than raising separation ofpowers principles at this stage, the
more appropriate
question was whether the plaintiff had a personal stake in
the outcome." 7 The mixture of the two issues did more than generate confu-

110.

See id. at 776-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparing case to Norwood v.Harrison,

413 U.S. 455 (1973)).
111.
112.

Norwood,413 U.S. at455.
See id.at 465-66 (discussing whether providing free textbooks to private schools is

determinative factor affecting enrollment).
113. Id.
114. See Allen v.Wright,468 U.S. 737, 789-95 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (examining
three possible meanings of the Court's use of separation of powers and finding that none refuse
standing to plaintiffs).
115. Allen, 468 U.S. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. TRME, supra note 62, at 385 (emphasis added) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 731 (1972)).
117. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 791 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The strength of the plaintifis
interest in the outcome has nothing to do with whether the relief itseeks would intrude upon
the prerogatives of other branches of government; the possibility that the relief might be
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sion. Worse, it allowed the Court to "encourage undisciplined, ad hoc litigation."' " The effect was to allow lower courts to actually reach the merits and
dispose of the lawsuit without allowing the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove
their case." 9 Therefore, Allen illustrates how the use of rigid notions of
causation, purportedly to serve articulated structural principles, can ultimately
frustrate progressive and minority group interests.
B. MunicipalLiability: FederalismAgain
"A primary function of the federal courts is to provide relief against
governments and government officers for their violations of the Constitution
and the laws of the United States."' 20 However, the Supreme Court has also
used rigid notions of causation to frustrate plaintiffs' abilities to hold municipalities liable for constitutional violations. A recent Supreme Court case,
Boardof the County Commissionersv. Brown,' exemplifies this trend.
Some background is in order. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action
against any person acting "under color of law" who deprives any other person
of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws"
ofthe United States.1 2 Prior to the seminal Warren Court decision in Monroe
v. Pape," plaintiffs rarely invoked the statute. 24 Issued in 1961, Monroe
breathed new vigor into § 1983 by interpreting the meaning of "under color
of law" broadly." s In Monroe, the Court ruled that an individual officer's
actions taken in her official capacity, even if unauthorized or illegal, were
nonetheless actions taken "under color of law" for the purposes of § 1983
126
liability.
But while the Warren Court essentially reinvented § 1983 jurisprudence
by allowing cases to go forward against individual officers, it was far less
complacent about suits against municipal entities. In Monroe, the Court
inappropriate does not lessen the plaintiff's stake in obtaining that relief.").
118. Id. at 791-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. ERWIN CHEMEuNSKY, FEDERAL JURSDICTION 448 (3d ed. 1999).
121.
520 U.S. 397 (1997).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
123.
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
124. See CHMERINSKY, supra note 120, at 455 (identifying historical'reasons for scarce
use of§ 1983).
125.
Id. at 459; see also HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & EuzABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW AND PRACTICE 62 (2001) (describing Monroe v. Pape as a product of "judicial dynamism").
126. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-84 (1961) (construing predecessor statute 42
U.S.C. § 1979 (1871)), overruled by Monell v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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concluded that municipal governments were not "persons" for the purposes of
§ 1983 liability and thereby created a disjunction between the treatment of
individual officers and municipalities under the statute. 27 The Court based its
ruling on a reading of § 1983's legislative history; specifically, congressional
rejection of the Sherman Amendment, which "would have imposed strict
liability on cities for specified violent acts, even though the city and its officials did not participate and were not directly responsible.' ' 28 The Court
interpreted the rejection of the Sherman Amendment as meaning that "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of'
§ 1983.129
In 1978, the Burger Court corrected this disjunction inMonell v. Department of SocialServices 30 and overruled Monroe to the extent that it held that
municipalities were not subject to § 1983 liability.'
Looking at the same
legislative history that the Warren Court had interpreted seventeen years
before to prohibit municipal liability, the Burger Court reached the opposite
conclusion. In Monell, the Court found that Congress rejected the Sherman
Amendmentbecause it would have made municipalities liable for the wrongdoing of others almost as an insurer; however, nothing said in the debate "on
the Sherman amendment would have prevented holding a municipality liable
under § 1 of 132
the Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'
At the same time that the Burger Court promoted a more expansive
reading of § 1983 than the Warren Court, theMonell Court placed a significant
limitation on the ability to hold municipalities liable under § 1983: no
respondeat superior liability existed under that section. 33 Municipalities
would be liable only for their own violations of the Constitution and laws; that
is, by virtue of the entity's actions which "may fairly be said to represent
official policy."' 34 Thus, Monell required that plaintiffs seeking to hold
municipalities liable under § 1983 show that an official policy or custom
caused the deprivation at issue. 135 As the Court stated: "[The language of
127.

128.

See id. at 187 (construing predecessor statute 42 U.S.C. § 1979 (1871)).
CHDEERINSKY, supra note 120, at 474.
See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (construing predecessor statute 42 U.S.C. § 1979

129.
(1871)).
130. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
131.
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688-89 (1978) (finding municipal
corporations within plain meaning of Civil Rights Act).
132. Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
133. See id. at 691 (concluding that municipalities cannot be held liable solely through
employment of tortfeasor).
134. Id. at 694.
135.
d. at 691.
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§ 1983 read against the background of the same legislative history, compels the
conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless

action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.136

As has been argued, the imposition of a causation requirement to delineate the line between conduct for which a municipality might be liable under
§ 1983 is best viewed as reflective of certain policy choices rather than as
fidelity to any revised understanding of legislative history.'3" Thus, Monell
can be understood as simultaneously curing the disjunction that had previously
existed while protecting municipalities from1 3large damage awards that might
"seriously undermine municipal autonomy. 1
Monell has spawned a complex body of law elucidating the question of
when an official municipal policy exists for the purposes of assigning § 1983
liability.1 39 I focus on one narrow aspect of that doctrine, the question of when

negligent hiring or inadequate training or supervision amounts to an official
policy, and on a recent case examining that question: Board of County Commissioners ofBryan County v. Brown 40
Bryan County concerned an allegation of excessive use of force by Stacy
Burns, a sheriff's deputy, who injured the plaintiff while attempting to remove
her from her car after a high speed chase. 4' Plaintiff argued that a court could
hold the county liable for the deputy's alleged use of excessive force because
Sheriff Robert Morrison, a "final decision maker"'42 for the county, had failed
to review Deputy Bums' record adequately.' 43 Prior to assuming his position,
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing FederalismConcernsand
MunicipalAccountability Under § 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539, 542-43 (1989) ("As a
limitation on § 1983 municipal liability, Monell's policy or. custom requirement strikes a
fundamental balance between (1) making municipalities accountable in federal court for their
constitutional violations and (2) accommodating federalism concerns - including broad
concerns about the traditional roles of states and their political subdivisions in 'our constitutional universe' and particular concerns about the increased power of federal courts to interfere
with municipal autonomy."). See generallyJack M. Beerman, A CriticalApproachto § 1983
with SpecialAttention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989).
138.
Gerhardt, supranote 137, at 542.
139.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 120, at 478-90 (discussing Monell decision and its
aftermath).
140. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
141. Bd. of County Comm'rs ofBryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,400-01 (1997).
142. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 125, at 173 ("[P]olicy can be established not only
through conduct formally adopted by the entity or enshrined in settled custom but also through
decisions of a final policy-making official who commits the federal law violation herself or
ratifies the unlawful act of a delegate.").
143. Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 401.
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Bums (who was related to Morrison) had pleaded guilty to, inter alia, assault
and battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness."' Sheriff Morrison
testified that he did not "closely review" Bums' record prior to extending him
a position. 45
The question was whether the county's decision to hire Bums was "so
inadequate as to amount to deliberate indifference to the constitutional needs
of the Plaintiff." '46 Courts have developed the deliberate indifference standard
to determine whether a "policy" exists for the purposes of assigning § 1983
liability to a municipality in situations involving omission or inaction that is
fairly traceable to the municipality. Such inactions or omissions include
failing to train or to supervise adequately an employee or failing to review
adequately an applicant's prior record.'47
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor perceived the question at
hand as presenting difficult issues of fault and causation. 4 ' In situations in
which the plaintiff asserts that the municipality essentially "caused" the
employee to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutionally protected rights, she
must "demonstrate a direct casual link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights."' 49 The need to protect the "no respondeat
superior" rule inherited from Monell justified the requirement that plaintiff
show such a "direct causal link":
Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an
injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards
of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality
is not held liable solely for the actions of the employee."
To be sure, prior to Bryan County, the Supreme Court had insisted on a "clear
causal link between an unconstitutional omission and harm suffered by the
plaintiff' 151 in "failure to train" and "failure to supervise" cases. For instance,
in City of Canton v. Harris,'2 a "failure to train" case, the Court ruled that the

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.at 402 (quoting Appendix 135 of district court opinion).
147. See LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 125, at 183 (describing omissions or inactions
traceable to municipality).
148. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,405 (1997)
(distinguishing claims that municipality directly inflicted injury from those in which injury
resulted from indirect actions).
149. Id. at 404.
150. Id. at 405.
151.
LEWIs & NORMAN,supra note 125, at 184.
152. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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failure to train must be the result of a deliberate or conscious choice on the
part of the municipality.153
But Bryan County went further by making it "significantly more difficult
to prove municipal policy based on deliberate indifference."154 In Bryan
County, the Court tightened the causation analysis considerably, creating a
new and higher threshold for determining when deliberate indifference
exists."' Thus, a deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights must be
a "plainly obvious consequence" ofthe hiring decision for the official's failure
to screen the applicant's record adequately to be considered deliberate indifference for § 1983 municipal liability." 6 This standard significantly decreases
chance of prevailing in a § 1983 municipal liability screening
a plaintiff's
7
case.

15

From the Court's perspective, why was such a tightening necessary? The
answer was federalism. In Bryan County, a fear of "federalizing" hiring
standards necessitated the imposition of an enhanced causation requirement
in screening cases. As the Court stated: "A failure to apply stringent culpability and causation requirements raises serious federalism concerns, in that it
risks constitutionalizing particular hiring requirements that States have
themselves elected not to impose." '

The rationale for the application of a

heightened causation standard, then, was the need to protect the states from
an overarching federal government. The Cqurt achieved its goal of preserving
federalism by using causation and constraining the ability of the federal courts
to provide more adequate relief to plaintiffs alleging constitutional violations.
Bryan County did not disturb the law governing individual defendants in
their individual capacities. However, even when plaintiffs prevail against
individual officers, the officers are often judgment proof, necessitating the
inclusion of an entity defendant to adequately compensate plaintiffs and,
moreover, to deter municipalities from violating constitutionally protected
rights. 59 As Erwin Chemerinsky has explained, Bryan County was problem153. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (holding that "only where a
municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate
indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as
a city 'policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983").
154. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 120, at 485.
155. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 422 (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Court's formulation of deliberate indifference represented
new standard).
156. Id. at411.
157. CHEME1USKY, supra note 120, at 486.
158. Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 415.
159. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 843-44 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
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atic because the jury found that "the Sheriff's deliberate indifference in hiring
caused the injuries to Brown," a finding that the record supported."6 Yet, the
holding in Bryan County frustrated the plaintiff's ability to be made whole
from that municipality. Just as with the standing doctrine and the desegregation implementation decisions, the imposition of rigid causation requirements
frustrated more progressive aims.
IV Affirmative Action: The Same or Different?
The final way in which the Court has used rigid notions of causation to
frustrate progressive aims comes from the affirmative action area. How might
we think of the affirmative action cases in connection with the desegregation
mandate, standing doctrine, and municipal liability cases - does any relationship among them exist? I want to suggest that one does. I argued previously
that a close examination of the desegregation implementation decisions
revealed a pattern that was present in other areas of the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence. Those cases revealed successive and more
conservative Supreme Courts attempting to undermine Brown I through the
application of increasingly constrained notions of causation. Rigid, constricted notions of causation changed the underlying meaning of Brown I, not
in a forthright fashion, but in a manner that dissipated criticism by constant
reference to the need to protect an important constitutional principle: federalism.
This Part of the Article focuses on City of Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co.,6 a familiar and very important affirmative action case, but one not
normally examined for its analysis of causation. However, causation played
a large role in the case. In order to fully appreciate the causation analysis
embedded within Croson,we must first consider how the Court has analyzed
the question of "societal discrimination" in the affirmative action context.
The United States Supreme Court has not definitively stated when the
relationship between state action and private discriminatory conduct justifies
a governmental affirmative action plan. 62 Instead, the Court's interpretative
approach has left an open window that is framed on one side by action that
163
clearly cannot justify an affirmative action plan ("societal discrimination")
dissenting) (describing policy interests in providing fair compensation for victim and deterring
future violations).
160. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 120, at 486.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
161.
162. See Adarand v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1167 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing ambiguity
surrounding Supreme Court's decision in Croson regarding strength of evidence necessary to
justify municipality's affirmative action plan).
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
163.
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and on the other by action that can (when the state actor becomes a "'passive
participant' in a system of [private] racial exclusion")."
The Burger Court's first discussion of "societal discrimination" in the
context of an evaluation of an affirmative action program came in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education.16 5 At issue was an affirmative action plan
contained in a collective bargaining agreement that provided a retention
preference for minority teachers in the event of a layoff. 66 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the retention preference on the theory
that additional minority teachers would serve as "role models" for minority
students, thereby alleviating the effects of "societal discrimination."' 6 In the
absence of any finding of discrimination against the Board of Education, 6 '
this was a theory of discrimination unconnected to any particular perpetrator;
a definition of discrimination that could include actions taken by private
actors, public actors not before the court, or some combination of the two.
The Sixth Circuit essentially proceeded on an underrepresentation theory that
compared the number of minority teachers to the number of minority students,
found a disparity, and concluded that minority students had been deprived of
effective role models as a result. 69
Writing for the plurality in Wygant, Justice Powell rejected this approach,
stating in plain and unqualified language that: This Court never has held that
societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification.
Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by
the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. 7 ' For Justice Powell, "societal discrimination," as employed by the lower courts as a justification for a
racial classification, was infirm because ofthe term's amorphousness.17 This
was the problem of the indeterminate perpetrator. Generalized discrimination,
of an unknown origin and by an unknown force, could not justify a racial
classification, especially because there could be "numerous explanations for
a disparity." '72 Thus, societal discrimination was an over-inclusive category

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (plurality opinion).
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
See id. at 274 (describing court of appeal's reasoning).
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152,1155 (6th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1156.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986).
Id. at276.
Id.
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of harm, an empty and insufficient vessel upon which to base an affirmative
action plan.'73
In contrast to the desire to remedy mere societal discrimination, however,
the plurality held that an affirmative action plan that attempted to remedy the
present effects of past discriminatory conduct or present discrimination itself
could be supported by "some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved."' 74 Justice O'Connor immediately refined this position
in her concurring opinion, which stated that, while a finding of discriminatory
conduct against the public entity was not required prior to the creation of an
affirmative action plan, a "firm basis for concluding that remedial action was
Taken as a whole, the Wygant opinion was
appropriate" was necessary.'
binary in its approach: societal discrimination was juxtaposed against public
actor discrimination and the opinion recognized no other possibilities. Thus,
Wygant did not comprehend a situation in which a public entity might justify
its affirmative action plan because of private discrimination that it somehow
had aided, abetted, supported, or otherwise condoned, as distinct from societal
discrimination more generally.
This situation changed dramatically three years later, when the Rehnquist
Court evaluated an affirmative action requirement in a local governmental
procurement scheme in City ofRichmond v. J A. Croson Co. 76 Richmond's
Minority Business Utilization Plan required prime contractors working on city
contracts to subcontract thirty percent of the contract amount to at least one
"minority business enterprise" (MBE).' The plan was intended to address
the racial disparity in the city's contracting practices."" Thus, the City
Council intended the plan to remediate the "present effects of past discrimination in the construction industry."'179

173. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting desire to "counter[] the effects of societal discrimination" as adequate
justification for medical school admissions plan that set aside sixteen seats of one hundred in

incoming class for minority group members).
174.

Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274; see also Johnson v. Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 650

(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring inthe judgment) ("In Wygant, the Court was in agreement that
remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty interest
to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action plan.").
175. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 289-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
176. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
177. City of Richmond v. I.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,477 (1989).
178. See id. at 479-80 (describing purpose of city's Minority Business Utilization Plan).
179. See id. at 498 (quoting Supplemental Appendix 163).
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Speaking through Justice O'Connor, the Court ruled that Richmond's
plan violated the Equal Protection Clause."' ° The problem was that the plan
lacked the necessary specificity and the appropriate factual predicate required
to justify race-conscious action. 8 ' Instead, the Court viewed the plan as an
attempt to redress mere "societal discrimination" because Richmond had made
only a "generalized assertion" about "past discrimination in an entire industry"
in an effort to defend its plan.1" 2 Upon closer analysis, the role that rigid
notions of causation played in Croson becomes evident.
The Richmond plan was remedial in nature in that it attempted to "remedy various forms of past discrimination that are alleged to be responsible for
the small number of minority businesses in the local contracting industry." ' 3
The plan pursued this goal through use of a race-conscious set-aside. The
difficulty from the Court's perspective was that a disconnect existed between
the goal (remedying past discrimination in the construction industry) and the
method used to achieve that goal (a race-conscious set aside). The disconnect
arose from the lack of an appropriate "factual predicate."' 4 For the Court, the
appropriate factual predicate would have included specific information
suggesting that discrimination in the construction industry yesterday caused
the lack of minority contractors eligible to compete for contracts in Richmond
today. Indeed, that was the import of the Court's language admonishing the
City Council for basing its plan on "generalized assertions" of past discrimination in the construction industry:
While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public
discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for
black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannotjustify a rigid
racial quota in the awarding of public contracts in Richmond, Virginia....
It is sheer speculation how many minority firms there would be in Richmond absent past societal discrimination, just as it was sheer speculation
how many minority medical students would have been admitted to the
medical school at Davis absent past discrimination in educational opportunities. Defining these sorts ofinjuries as "identified discrimination" would
give local governments license to create a patchwork of racial preferences
based on statistical generalizations about any particular field of endeavor. 5
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. atSll.
See id.
at 489-90 (plurality opinion) (describing deficiencies in city's plan).
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
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The Court's incantation of "sheer speculation" here reinforced its argument that the Richmond plan lacked the appropriate factual predicate, that is,
that the City Council lacked a "strong basis in evidence" for concluding that
race-conscious action was necessary.186 According to the Court, sufficient
evidence simply did not exist in the legislative record "tying" the need for the
MBE set-aside to the injury that the City Council sought to ameliorate to
justify race-conscious relief." 7 Instead, the City Council needed to produce
evidence of identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry
sufficient to raise an inference of "discriminatory exclusion." 188 One interpretation of this reasoning is that the City Council had not shown the appropriate
causal relationship between past discrimination in the construction industry
and the dearth of minority contractors to justify its affirmative action plan.
Without such a clear and defined relationship, the lack of minority contractors
was open to any number of other, competing explanations that could be
untethered from discriminatory action on the part of either the construction
industry or the city.'89
At first blush, this approach appears to track the application of rigid
notions of causation in the standing and municipal liability areas closely. In
these areas, important constitutional principles necessitated a strong defense.
Federalism and separation of powers concerns were thought to be so significant as to trump the interests of the plaintiffs. From this perspective, the
Court achieved the greater good and avoided damage to our constitutional
system when it either dismissed the case or refused to enter relief. Under this
view, the application of rigid, constricted notions of causation in those cases
served to protect and defend larger constitutional principles.
A similar argument could also be made in the affirmative action context.
In Croson, four Justices justified the decision to strike down Richmond's
affirmative action plan on the grounds that the Equal Protection Clause
protects "personal" as opposed to group rights and that racial classifications
carry the danger of imposing significant stigmatic harm."9 According to this
plurality, the threat posed by preferential race-based programs was so great

that it trumped the ability of the state and its entities to make determinations

186. Id. at 500.
187. See id. at 499 (explaining why race-conscious plan was inappropriate).
188. See id. at 503-05 (explaining requirements for appropriate race-conscious plan).
189. See id. at 503 ("There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation, including past societal discrimination in education and economic opportunities as well as
both black and white career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately
attracted to industries other than construction.").
190. See id. at 493 (plurality opinion) (explaining why Court should strike down plan).
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with respect to their contracting programs.191 The Justices were right to be
skeptical of the state and its political subdivisions in situations in which the
state was legislating about race, as the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
had placed "clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion for legislative
action, and [intended] to have the federal courts enforce those limitations.."' '
From this perspective, the Court was playing its rightful role as protector of
individual rights against oppression by the majority.'9 3 While the cost of
striking down the Richmond plan might be significant in the sense that it was
a worthy attempt to address the "sorry history" of racial discrimination, 94 the
inherent perniciousness of racial categories and the importance of protecting
individual rights justified that cost.
However, in the separation of powers and federalism areas, the Court was
arguably playing an important umpiring role - under the standing doctrine,
refereeing the appropriate allocation of power among co-equal branches, and
in the desegregation implementation and municipal liability cases, finding the
appropriate balance of power between the federal government and the states.
In both situations, if the price of resolution of those thorny "institutional"
problems was a constraint on the power of the federal courts to order relief to
otherwise deserving plaintiffs, so be it. Arguably, the desegregation implementation decisions, the standing doctrine cases, and the municipal liability
proceedings all counseled toward notions of judicial restraint, particularly
when another governmental actor existed that was better situated to make the
appropriate determination. Thus, the argument is that the Court should not
maintain judicial control over a school district, hear a case in which the
plaintiff lacks the constitutional requirements of standing, or risk ordering
relief, when doing so might lead to the constitutionalization of employee
screening requirements. From this perspective, the causation analysis at the
heart of those decisions ensured the appropriate amount of judicial restraint.
However, this line of argument does not support the result in Croson. In
Croson, the Court trumped the power of the state and its entities to attempt to
ameliorate the present effects of past discriminatory conduct. 9" Croson is
hardly a decision that defends notions of federalism or judicial restraint.
Arguably, the Richmond City Council was in a much better position to deter-

191.
See id. (plurality opinion) (noting danger of stigmatic harm that accompanies racebased classifications).
192. Id. at 490-91 (plurality opinion).
193. See TRIBE, supra note 62, at 389 (describing article, Scalia, supra note 88, stressing
role of Article III courts in protecting individuals against impositions by majority).
194. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,499 (1989).
195. See id.at 500 (striking down city's MBE plan).
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mine the appropriate way to redress generations of racial discrimination in its
construction industry. It was making law "on the ground" - Justice
O'Connor's allusions to legislative capture notwithstanding. 196 The use of
rigid notions of causation allowed the Court in Croson to engage in judicial
activism and strike down the will of the majority.
V Conclusion
What are we to make of all of this? One possibility is simply that the
Court was correct in each of these situations that I have examined, with the
use of narrow notions of causation allowing it to reach appropriate determinations more effectively. But I subscribe to another, far more ominous possibility. One can also see the use of rigid notions of causation as a free-floating
judicial tool allowing the Court to reach certain outcomes. From that perspective, the desegregation implementation decisions, the standing doctrine,
municipal liability, and affirmative action are all harmonized as bound by the
Court's use of narrow and prescribed notions of causation to reach particular
outcomes that tend to frustrate progressive ideals. Thus, decisions in the
standing, municipal liability, and affirmative action areas demonstrate an
exceedingly effective use of this technique.
The Brown implementation cases thus form a thematic bridge between
the progressive Warren Court and later eras dominated by far more conservative, if not reactionary, Supreme Courts. I stated at the outset that the Warren
Court's jurisprudence, and therefore its legacy, was political. Because our
Supreme Court jurisprudence is evolutionary, we must consider not only the
Warren Court's decisions in their time, but also the ways in which those
decisions have developed into legacy. Later Supreme Courts, dominated by
more conservative Justices, have limited the progressive reach of the Warren
Court under the guise of federalism and separation of powers concerns.

196. Id. at 490-92 (plurality opinion). The persuasiveness of this argument was effectively
nullified in Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 252-53 (1995), in which the Court extended its
holding to the federal government. One can hardly argue that minority group members have
effectively captured both houses of the United States Congress.

